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T HIS year's survey of commercial transactions again focuses on court
opinions construing the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in
Texas.' This Article follows the scope and format adopted in the Survey
articles of the past several years.2 Although there are no Texas legislative
developments to report, on the national scene the sponsors of the Code
have published a 1978 Official Text of the Code, which incorporates
amendments made in 1977 to the Code provisions dealing with investment
securities.'
Court opinions construing the language of the Code grow not only in
number but also in sophistication. In large measure this increased sophis-
tication may be attributed to the growing number of useful publications
interpreting Code provisions.' Fewer opinions appear to overlook the pos-
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1. In this Article both textual and footnote citations are to the Texas Uniform Com-
mercial Code [hereinafter referred to as the Code] as incorporated in the first eleven chap-
ters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-
11.108 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1978-79). The Code became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966,
and in 1967 it became part of the Business and Commerce Code. The Code has been
amended several times since 1967 and now generally conforms with the 1972 Official Text of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. See Winship, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J.
181 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Annual Survey]; Winship, Commercial Transactions,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Annual Sur-
vey].
3. ALl & NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL TEXT-1978 (9TH ED.
1978). The appropriate committee of the State Bar of Texas is evaluating the revision of
article 8. 16 TEX. ST. B. BULL. SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L. No. 2, Dec. 1978, at 27.
The state bar did not include any amendments to the Code in its legislative program for the
1979 legislative session. 42 TEx. B.J. 13 (1979). At the national level further amendments to
the Official Text of the Code are being prepared. The Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code has appointed a "348 Committee" to review the Code provi-
sions on negotiable and investment instruments. An American Bar Association committee is
revising article 6 (bulk transfers). See Hawkland, The Trouble with Article 6 of the UCC"
Some Thoughts About Section 6-103, 82 CoM. L.J. 113 (1977).
4. For recent publications, see R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COM-
MERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1977); W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
(1978); R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1979); T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND
LAW DIGEST (1978); Professor Barclay Clark has prepared a text on secured transactions,
organized on functional lines, which will be published in 1979. For publications more read-
ily available in Texas, see W. DORSANEO, R. ANDERSON & P. WINSHIP, TEXAS LITIGATION
GUIDE-COMMERCIAL LITIGATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as DORSANEO, ANDERSON &
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sible applicability of the Code,5 and an increasing number of courts are
applying Code policy by analogy.6
I. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope of Chapter 2 (Sales)
Sale of Goods or Rendering of Services. Chapter 2 on sales covers "trans-
actions in goods," with the primary focus on sales and contracts for sale.7
In practice, however, commercial transactions may involve not only the
sale of a product but also the rendering of services. The classic cases are
hospitals that provide blood transfusions and hairdressers who apply hair
products. Since the non-Code rules governing service contracts may differ
from the Code rules, there are occasions when it becomes important to
distinguish the sales from the service contract. Two recent Texas court
opinions faced with this problem apply a mechanical test: is the "essence"
of the transaction the rendering of services or the sale of goods? In Potts v.
W Q. Richards Memorial Hospital' the dispute was whether the two-year
statute of limitations or the Code's four-year statute of limitations gov-
erned in a case where the plaintiff hospital supplied both goods and serv-
ices.9 The court held that the Code did not apply because "the essence of a
hospital stay is the furnishing of the institution's healing services, which
may include incidental sales of medicines and the like."'" In Freeman v.
Shannon Construction, Inc. i" the dispute concerned the proper measure of
WINSHIP]; STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS COMMERCIAL LAW FOR GENERAL PRACTITIONERS
(1977).
5. But see Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978), discussed at note Il1
infra. In the area of damages for breach of sales contracts there is a disturbing tendency to
avoid discussing the relevant Code sections and policies. See Little Darling Corp. v. Aid,
Inc., 566 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ); Harper Bldg. Sys. v. Upjohn
Co., 564 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); W.B. Dunavant &
Co. v. Southmost Growers, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). These cases are discussed at notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text. This
tendency is unfortunate because some of the most interesting academic literature is being
published in this area. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties.
Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351; Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the
Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of
Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1978); Priest, Breach and Remedyfor the
Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Un!form Commercial Code: An Economic Ap-
proach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1978).
6. Compare Graham v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 741, 745-47 (N.D. Tex. 1977), with
MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
See also Aycock v. Vantage Management Co., 554 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App--Dallas
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Sometimes courts will apply Code provisions without questioning
their applicability. See Chaplin v. Milne, 555 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977, no writ) (§ 2.202 ap lied to romissory note despite judicial admission of oral agree-
ment that the court foun contra icted the printed note).
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1968). The terms "sale," "contract
for sale," and "goods" are all defined by the Code. Id. §§ 2.105(a), .106(a).
8. 558 S.W.2d 939, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
9. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958) with TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Vernon 1968).
10. 558 S.W.2d at 946.




damages. A subcontractor for certain cement work on a construction pro-
ject argued that section 2.713 of the Code provided the proper damage
formula. The court, however, held that the "dominant factor" or "es-
sence" of the transaction was the furnishing of services, and the Code
therefore did not apply. 2
Without questioning the results of these cases, one may suggest that it
would be sounder to examine the policies underlying the relevant statutes
to determine which would be more appropriate under the circumstances. ' 3
The need to examine these underlying policies is suggested by the Texas
Supreme Court opinion in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prod-
ucts.14 In that case one of the defendants argued that the implied war-
ranty provisions of the Code did not apply to it because it merely
assembled and did not "sell" the isomax heater that failed. The court re-
jected this argument on the ground that the assembler was an essential link
in the distribution chain: "The suitability of the finished product depends
as much upon actions of the assembler as upon actions of the manufac-
turer of the component parts."'" On a more formalistic level, the court
also noted that the defendant purported to retain title until it had com-
pleted assembly of the unit. While the court does not relate its discussion
of the role of the assembler to the policy underlying the implied warranty
provision nor suggest what rule would apply if the Code did not, the
court's realistic approach is a sounder implementation of the legislative
policy embodied in the Code than is the mechanical "essence of the trans-
action" test.'6
Sale or Exchange. Although the general scope provision of chapter 2 of
the Code encompasses "transactions" in goods, most of the particular
sections in that chapter are limited to the "sale" or "contract for sale" of
goods. A sale is defined as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price."'" The price can be made payable in money or otherwise,
including an exchange of property."' Pre-Code Texas law distinguished a
"sale" from an "exchange" as follows: an exchange occurred when each
party transferred property to the other without an agreed value being
placed on the property, while a sale resulted if the parties agreed on the
12. 560 S.W.2d at 737-39. The court adopted a damage formula that awarded "the
excess of the reasonable and necessary cost of completion over and above the unpaid portion
of the contract price." Id. at 735-36.
13. See R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 46-47 (1970); Comment,
Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions. A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575 (1974).
14. 572 S.W.2d 320, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 555 (Tex. 1978). For the court's discussion of
the definition of "seller," see 572 S.W.2d at 329-31.
15. 572 S.W.2d at 330.
16. Although the court addressed only the question of the defendant's status as a
"seller" under the Code, the court's policy reasoning presumably extends to strict liability
under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which also applies to "sellers."
17. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1968).
18. Id. § 2.106(a) (emphasis added).
19. Id. § 2.304(a).
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value of the property.2" The court in Calloway v. Manion2 ' alluded to this
pre-Code distinction, but did not decide whether it had been eliminated by
the Code because the parties in that case had agreed on the value of the
property; therefore, even under pre-Code law there was a sale. Given the
language of the Code,22 it is difficult to see how this pre-Code technical
distinction survives, at least in the context of chapter 2 on sales.23
Choice of Law. Section 1.105 of the Code24 adopts a general choice-of-
law provision, permitting parties to select the law that will govern the
transaction if that transaction bears a "reasonable relation" to the state or
nation whose law is chosen. If the parties fail to select the governing law,
then section 1.105 directs the court to apply the version of the Code in
force in the state where the court sits as long as that state has an "appropri-
ate relation" to the transaction. The Code provision appears to assume
that the parties will choose the governing law at the time of contracting,
but in Calloway v. Manion25 the Fifth Circuit had little difficulty in enforc-
ing the parties' stipulation as to the governing law even though it was en-
tered into after a dispute had arisen between them. The court required
only that the stipulated law bear a reasonable relation to the transaction.26
B. Formation of Contracts
Contract Formation. Many Code provisions were designed to encourage
the enforcement of the parties' "real" bargain, including section 2.207,
which has received more than its share of academic commentary. 27 Diffi-
cult questions obviously arise when the parties do not set out their agree-
ment in a single document. In Harper Building Systems, Inc. v. Upjohn
Co. 21 the buyer apparently submitted an order form to the seller, which
responded by sending the ordered goods together with a specification sheet
containing instructions on the use of the goods. At the bottom of the speci-
fication sheet there was a clause limiting the buyer's exclusive remedy for
breach of warranty to the purchase price of the goods. The majority opin-
ion did not give effect to this clause on the ground that it was not part of an
"expression of acceptance" because there was no evidence as to when the
buyer received the specification sheet. The dissenting opinion argued that
20. Griswold v. Tucker, 216 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, no writ).
21. 572 F.2d 1033, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 1143 (5th Cir. 1978).
22. "If [the price] is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of the
goods which he is to transfer." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.304(a) (Vernon 1968).
23. But see Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 797
(5th Cir. 1978). In Weisbart the court referred to the pre-Code "technical" distinction when
construing § 9.306(b) of the Code, which specifically mentions both a sale and an exchange
("sale, exchange or other disposition"). 568 F.2d at 395.
24. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
25. 572 F.2d 1033, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 1143 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. 572 F.2d at 1036.
27. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Vernon 1968). See, e.g., Murray, Section 2-
207 of the Uniform Commercial Code." Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39
U. PiTr. L. REV. 597 (1978).
28. 564 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the buyer's use of the specification sheet was an expression of his accept-
ance and he had failed to object to its terms. The result reached by the
majority is the better one. Even if one concludes that the contemporane-
ous sending of the goods and the form was the seller's expression of ac-
ceptance, without regard to when the buyer received the goods and the
form, one would not give effect to the clause under section 2.207(b)(2) be-
cause it Would materially alter the buyer's original offer as set forth in his
order form. z9
Contract Terms-Parol Evidence. Section 2.202 of the Code restates the
parol evidence rule for all transactions in goods.3" This restatement refines
the rule and liberalizes the introduction of parol evidence, especially with
respect to evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade. Unfortunately,
in Hobbs Trailers v. .T Arnett Grain Co.3' the Texas Supreme Court ig-
nored many of these statutory refinements. In that case the lessee of a
tractor trailer sought to introduce evidence that it had an oral agreement
with the lessor's authorized salesman that it could purchase the equipment
on the payment of one dollar at the end of the lease term. The "equipment
lease" contract form stated that the lessee did not acquire any right, title,
or interest in the equipment and that the instrument was the entire agree-
ment between the parties. The lessee argued that the proffered evidence of
the purchase option was evidence of a consistent additional term that sup-
plemented the written instrument. The trial court admitted the lessee's ev-
idence, and the jury findings supported the lessee's theory. The trial court,
however, disregarded the jury findings on the ground that the evidence
violated the parol evidence rule. The court of civil appeals reversed the
trial court, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals
and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
In a majority opinion that grossly oversimplified the statutory language,
the supreme court held that the evidence was not admissible because the
evidence "varied and contradicted the clear and exclusive terms of the
written contract. ' 32 A careful reading of the Code suggests that the result
29. "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: ... (2) they materially
alter it; . . ." TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (b)(2) (Vernon 1968). Note that the
seller could have accepted the buyer's order by shipping the ordered goods without any
further communication between the parties. Id. § 2.206(a)(2).
30. Id. § 2.202. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 68-81 (1972). Several non-Code cases decided
in this survey period illustrate well-established exceptions to the common law parol evidence
rule. Wright v. Gernandt, 559 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ) (reformation); Neuhaus v. Kain, 557 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (fraud). Although these exceptions are not included in the Code's
restatement of the parol evidence rule, presumably they continue to apply to commercial
transactions by virtue of § 1.103, which states that the general principles of law and equity
supplement the Code except where displaced. TEX. B us. & COM. CODE ANN. §f.103
(Vernon 1968).
31. 560 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1977), rev'g 540 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976).
32. 560 S.W.2d at 86. The court's one reference to the Code merely states: "Article
2.202 of the Uniform Commercial Code prohibits the contradiction of final written expres-
1979]
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reached in the majority opinion could have been supported by specific ref-
erence to at least two distinct parts of section 2.202(2). First, the court
found that the proferred evidence was of an inconsistent additional term.
Second, the court found that the parties had intended the writing to be a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement because
they had included a merger clause in the contract. It is unfortunate that
the court did not take the opportunity to refer to the specific language of
the Code or to discuss the policy underlying the Code provision.33
C. Warranties
Tort or Contract. Practical legal consequences depend on the determina-
tion of whether a remedy for a particular grievance about a defective prod-
uct falls within the ambit of "contract," which would activate Code
warranties, or "tort," which would involve a suit based on negligence or
strict liability. Privity, for example, is often required under a contract the-
ory but not under a tort theory; notice of a breach of a warranty may have
to be given under a contract theory, while notice may not be required to
recover on a tort theory; and different statutes of limitation may apply to
the different causes of action. Academic discussion of the policies underly-
ing the two different routes for resolving grievances, such as optimal "risk
allocation," has eroded strict conceptual distinctions between contract and
tort forms of action. As a result, many courts now re-examine traditional
distinctions in the light of these policy considerations.
A trio of recent Texas Supreme Court cases have explored the distinc-
tions between contract and tort theories. In Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shiv-
ers,34 commented on in last year's Survey,3 5 the court held that economic
losses could be recovered only in a warranty action under the Code, but
that the traditional contract requirement of privity is no longer necessary.
Subsequently, the court concluded in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry
County Spraying Service, Inc. 36 that an accident in which only the good
sions by evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement." Id. at 87. One might argue
that the Code did not apply because a lease rather than a sale of goods was involved. One
answer to this argument lies in the broad scope of ch. 2 (transactions in goods) and the
absence of "contract for sale" language in the Code statement of the parol evidence rule.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.102, .202 (Vernon 1968).
33. The parol evidence problem with respect to purchase options in what purports to be
a lease transaction has given rise to considerable case law and some commentary, none of
which was mentioned by the Texas court. See generally I B P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D.
VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 29A.06[l][a
(1977) [hereinafter cited as COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS]. One potentially fruitful line of
attack on these cases is to seek to introduce evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or
course of performance. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.205, 2.202(1), .208 (Vernon
1968).
34. 557 S.W.2d 77, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 621 (Tex. 1977), noted in 15 Hous. L. REV. 435
(1978) and 19 S. TEX. L.J. 319 (1978).
35. 1978 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 190-91. See also Comment, What Price Nobil-
ity? The Recovery of Economic Loss in Texas after Nobility Homes v. Shivers, 19 S. TEX. L.J.
292 (1978).
36. 572 S.W.2d 308, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 574 (Tex. 1978), revg 553 S.W.2d 935, 21 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977). The supreme court opinion is noted in 44
J. AIR L. & COM. 207 (1978). For a discussion of the opinion of the court of appeals, see
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that was purchased under a sales contract was damaged resulted in an eco-
nomic loss subject to the Code rules governing warranties, but did not give
rise to a right to recover in strict liability. An accident, however, that dam-
aged not only the purchased good but also other property would give rise
to a right to recover not only in warranty but also in tort, as exemplified by
Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products.3
7
These court decisions establish several important propositions. First, the
Code, strict liability, and negligence theories apparently are the exclusive
sources of recovery in products liability cases. It is no longer possible to
resort to the concept of "a warranty implied as a matter of public policy"
now that Texas has adopted both the Uniform Commercial Code and sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.38 Each theory is, in effect,
a "form of action" with its own elements that must be proved. A party
may determine which form of action is available in his or her case by ex-
amining the type of loss that has occurred. Economic losses may be recov-
ered only in warranty, but damages to persons or property may be
recovered under any of the forms of action if the party otherwise proves
each element of his theory. A party must be careful to submit jury issues
on each element of all of his theories.39
In addition, defenses available in tort suits may not be available in con-
tract actions. The Signal Oil opinion, for example, indicates that contribu-
tory negligence-a tort concept-is not a bar to recovery under an implied
warranty theory; any consequential damages proximately resulting from a
breach of warranty may be recovered. If the contributory negligence of
the buyer is one of several concurring proximate causes of a loss, the jury
must determine the respective percentages by which the concurring causes
contributed to the consequential damages.4" Similarly, a contract defense
may not be effective in tort. The court in Mid Continent, for example, held
that an "as is" contract clause is an effective disclaimer in warranty but
suggested that greater proof of the parties' intent to allocate the risk of loss
might be necessary when a seller attempts to disclaim potential damages in
1978 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 192-93. See also 19 S. TEX. L.J. 337 (1978); 9 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 733 (1978).
37. 572 S.W.2d 320, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 555 (Tex. 1978), afg inpart & rev'g inpart 545
S.W.2d 907, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977). For further discus-
sion of this case, see notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
38. The court stated this proposition in both the Nobility Homes and the Signal Oil
opinions. 557 S.W.2d at 78; 572 S.W.2d at 326-27. The court had suggested that there was
an "implied warranty as a matter of public policy" in its landmark decision of Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capp, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). The court later adopted
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
39. Jury issues relevant to one theory may not be interchangeable. The court in Signal
Oil indicated that issues as to "proximate cause" must be submitted on a negligence or a
warranty theory but that "producing cause" is the proper issue on a strict liability theory.
Jury findings as to one form of causation could not be used to support the other theory. 572
S.W.2d at 326.
40. This formula differs from the Texas comparative negligence statute, TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79), in that a buyer is entitled to recover even if
his percentage of negligence is found to be greater than the seller's. 572 S.W.2d at 329.
1979]
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negligence or strict liability.4
Express Warranties. Express warranties usually relate to the seller's affir-
mation or promise as to the quality of the goods sold.42 Although it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish a breach of a warranty from a breach of
a nonwarranty promise, it is necessary to make this distinction in suits
brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA)4 3 because the DTPA provides for recovery of treble damages for
breach of a warranty but not for other breaches of contracts in consumer
transactions."
Allen v. Parsons45 illustrates how difficult it may be to make this distinc-
tion. In Allen the seller agreed to sell a truck to the buyer. The seller also
promised to affix an inspection sticker on the truck if the buyer would do
the necessary work to enable the truck to pass inspection. The buyer did
the work, but the seller refused to affix the sticker; instead, he repossessed
the truck. The buyer prevailed in his DTPA suit, and the court of civil
appeals affirmed on the ground that the breach of the promise to affix the
sticker was a breach of an express Code warranty. The court noted that
the truck was useless to the buyer without the sticker and drew an analogy
to a promise by the seller "to repair a vehicle or to place a part or an
accessory on a vehicle."4 6 The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ of
error.
47
What makes the Allen case so difficult to grasp is that the buyer had
obtained possession of the truck before the promise to affix the sticker
could be performed. If the seller had kept possession and had promised to
deliver a truck that could be used on the road, his failure to tender deliv-
ery, by his inaction with respect to the sticker, would be considered a con-
tract breach, giving rise to the general remedies of Code sections 2.711-
2.713.48 The inaction would not be a breach of a warranty but rather a
breach of the seller's general obligation "to transfer and deliver."'49 It is
difficult to see how this analysis would change merely because the buyer
took possession before the seller's obligation to deliver a truck that could
be used on the highway arose. The earlier transfer of possession of the
equipment was for repairs rather than for tender of delivery of the truck.
Notice oBreach as Prerequisite to Remedy. If a buyer accepts and retains
a nonconforming good, he must notify the seller of the nonconformity
within a reasonable time after discovery of the breach or else be barred
41. 572 S.W.2d at 310-11, 313.
42. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Vernon 1968).
43. Id. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
44. Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
45. 555 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ granted).
46. Id. at 524.
47. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 178-79 (Feb. 4, 1978).
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.71 1-.713 (Vernon 1968).
49. Id. § 2.301.
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from any remedy under the Code.50 The buyer's notice does not have to
be formal, but it should be sufficient "to let the seller know that the trans-
action is still troublesome."'" A Code draftsman's comment suggests that
the reason for the notice is to encourage negotiations leading to informal
settlement.52 The court in Import Motors, Inc. v. Matthews,53 however,
suggested that the notice is necessary in order to allow the seller an oppor-
tunity to cure the defect. In this respect the court went beyond the lan-
guage and policy of the Code. In that case the buyer already had notified
the seller of an oil leak, and the seller already had attempted unsuccess-
fully to cure the problem. The seller, therefore, knew that the transaction
was still troublesome, and there would seem to be no need to require that
the buyer notify the seller of the reoccurrence of the leak. Moreover, un-
less the parties' contract so provided, and the court did not set forth the
contract language, the seller did not have a right to cure the defect under
section 2.508 of the Code.54 Nevertheless, the court held that the buyer
was barred from recovering on the basis of a breach of warranty because
of its failure to notify the seller of the reoccurrence of the leak.
Exclusion of Warranties. Section 2.316 of the Code validates agreements
that exclude or modify warranties.55 With careful attention to the wording
of the Code, one can construct boilerplate language disclaiming all implied
warranties, and many form contracts now include such boilerplate provi-
sions as a matter of course. The court in MacDonald v. Mobley5 6 gave an
interesting twist to the Code requirements that should not be overlooked.
The court in that case construed section 2.316 to require "as is" language
to be conspicuous in order to disclaim implied warranties effectively. This
conclusion was reached by reading the subparagraph (b) requirement of
section 2.316, which requires that a written modification of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness be conspicuous, into subpara-
graph (c)(1), which states than an expression such as "as is" excludes all
implied warranties. This construction of section 2.316 was apparently not
suggested by the plaintiffs in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Service, Inc. ,57 in which the court upheld an "as is" disclaimer.
50. Id. § 2.607(c)(1).
51. Id. § 2.607, comment 4.
52. Id.
53. 557 S.W.2d 807, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.).
54. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.508 (Vernon 1968) (seller can only cure prior to
expiration of time for performance, or if seller had reasonable grounds to believe tender
would be acceptable, within a reasonable time after the time for performance). The opinion
in Import Motors suggested that the implied warranty that was breached was a warranty of
good workmanship in repairing the oil leak. 557 S.W.2d at 809. If so, a warranty arising
fom a contract for sale was not involved and the Code provisions might not have been
directly applicable. This does not mean that the policies underlying the notice and cure
provisions should not have been applied by analogy.
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon 1968).
56. 555 S.W.2d 916, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.).
57. 572 S.W.2d 308, 313, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 574 (Tex. 1978).
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As a result, we do not have a definitive statement by the Texas Supreme
Court as to the Code's requirements on this point. Other reported Texas
decisions also indicate that sellers must make "as is" language conspicu-
ous58 and caution certainly suggests adopting this practice. Nevertheless,
the Code language deserves a closer analysis than was given in the Alac-
Donald opinion. 9
Code Warranties and Consumer Legislation. A plaintiff who brings a suc-
cessful action under the DTPA may recover three times the amount of his
"actual damages" plus court costs and attorneys' fees.6 ° A consumer who
has been adversely affected by a "breach of an express or implied war-
ranty ' 6 is expressly authorized to bring suit under the DTPA. As a result,
actions by "consumers" for breach of Code warranties should now rou-
tinely include a reference to the DTPA as well as the relevant Code provi-
sions.62
D. Performance
Tender of Delivery. The seller of goods has a general obligation "to trans-
fer and deliver."63 In carrying out this obligation the seller normally must
give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to
take delivery.64 The parties, however, may vary these Code provisions,65
and a buyer may agree to notify the seller when he is ready to take deliv-
ery. The seller in Jon- T Farms, Inc. v. Perryton Equity Exchange66 sought
to excuse its failure to tender delivery on the ground that the parties agreed
that the buyer would give the notice, which the buyer had failed to do.
The court agreed, citing section 2.311 (c)67 of the Code as the source of the
seller's right to consider the buyer's noncooperation as a breach of their
contract.
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance. A buyer who is tendered or re-
ceives nonconforming goods has two opportunities to call the contract off.
58. Eg., Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1158 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ), discussed in 1978 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 192.
59. For a good discussion of the issue, see Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd.,
274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
61. Id. § 17.50(a)(2).
62. The reported decisions for this survey period suggest that the DTPA is routinely
pleaded in warranty cases. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tidwell, 563 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Dallas Heating Co. v. Pardee, 561 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Allen v. Parsons, 555 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977, writ granted).
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.301 (Vernon 1968).
64. Id. § 2.503(a).
65. Id. § 1.102(c).
66. 567 S.W.2d 560, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 1136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.311(c) (Vernon 1968) (when cooperation of one
party is necessary to agreed performance of the other, and cooperation is not seasonably
forthcoming, the other party may, after time for a material part of his performance has
passed, treat the failure to cooperate as a breach).
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The buyer may "reject" goods delivered or tendered under the contract if
they fail "in any respect" to conform to the contract.68 Once the buyer
accepts the goods he no longer may reject them, but may "revoke his ac-
ceptance" if the nonconformity "substantially impairs [their] value to
him.",69 Although "rejection" and "revocation of acceptance" are theoreti-
cally distinct, sometimes the same facts will justify a finding of both. This
is illustrated by Don's Marine, Inc. v. Haldeman,7" in which the appellate
court upheld the trial court's judgment for the buyer on either the theory
of rejection under section 2.601 or revocation of acceptance under section
2.608 of the Code.
E. Remedies
Cancellation or Termination. The Code distinguishes between "cancella-
tion" and "termination." On breach of contract by the other party, the
nonbreaching party may "cancel" the contract and recover damages.'
"Termination," on the other hand, "occurs when either party pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise
than for its breach."'7 2 The distinction is illustrated by Frigiking, Inc. v.
Century Tire & Sales Co.7 3 In that case the contract provided for a termi-
nation procedure, which apparently was not followed by the seller upon
the buyer's breach. The court held that the seller did not have to follow
the termination procedure set out in the contract because the seller was
exercising the cancellation power granted him by the Code, and the Code
does not prescribe a specific procedure.
Seller's Recovery of Lost Profits. When a buyer does not accept con-
forming goods or when he repudiates the sales contract, the Code provides
a seller with several different damage formulas for putting himself in the
position he would have been in if the contract had been performed. The
most important of these formulas is found in section 2.708(b), which
awards "the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would
have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any inciden-
tal damages . - . , due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due
credit for payments or proceeds of resale."74 Pre-Code case law recog-
nized a similar lost profit formula and required the seller to establish his
damages with whatever degree of certainty reasonably could be expected
under the circumstances of the particular case. Given that the Code now
authorizes enforcement of contracts that contain some open terms, courts
are sometimes faced with difficulties when forced to determine damages
68. Id. § 2.601.
69. Id. § 2.608.
70. 557 S.W.2d 826, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.).
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.106(d), .703(6), .711 (Vernon 1968).
72. Id. § 2.106(c).
73. 452 F. Supp. 935, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 896 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Vernon 1968). See Goetz & Scott, Mea-
suring Sellers' Damages. The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979).
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with any degree of certainty. One such case is Little Darling Corp. v. Aid,
Inc. ,7 in which car wash units were to be delivered over a five-year period
on a "cost plus 25%" basis. The buyer had the right to order from four
types of units with different prices, and the seller had the right to redeter-
mine the initial cost price every six months. The seller brought suit due to
the buyer's failure to accept the number of units that it was obligated to
take. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, but the court of
appeals found insufficient evidence in the record to support jury findings
on the damage issue and remanded the case for a new trial.76 The court
did not cite or discuss the relevant Code provisions or policies.
Recovery of Damages by the Buyer. When the seller breaches a sales con-
tract by not delivering the goods, the buyer may either "cover" by buying
substitute goods and recover the difference between the cover price and the
contract price or recover the difference between the market price and the
contract price.77 The operation of these provisions is illustrated by WB.
Duna van! & Co. v. Southmost Growers, Inc. 71 In that case an agent for the
seller-cooperative was found to lack authority to sell on behalf of one
member, and the seller therefore was unable to deliver that member's cot-
ton to the buyer as promised. The buyer then bought the cotton directly
from the member at a price that reflected the market price at the time of
harvest and sued the seller for the damages caused by its failure to deliver.
In calculating the buyer's damages, the court cited section 2.712(a), which
is the measure of damages applicable when the buyer covers, but applied
the market-contract differential formula found in section 2.713. Since the
jury found that the "reasonable price" of the cotton at the time of cover
was the same as the cover price, there was no harm in the court's failure to
focus on the appropriate Code provision.
Consequential Damages. Following the seller's breach of a sales contract,
the buyer may recover as consequential damages "any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise."' 79 This Code formula allows for the re-
covery of lost profits that the buyer can show resulted from the breach.
Although the formula was a familiar one in pre-Code law, the Code directs
courts to administer this and other remedies liberally."s The majority
opinion in Harper Building Systems, Inc. v. Upjohn Co." examined evi-
75. 566 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
76. Due to the nature of the contract, the court believed that the plaintiffs cost per unit
had to be shown with reasonable certainty. The testimony of the plaintiffs vice president
merely alleged a profit figure to be multiplied by the number of units not accepted, which
the court found to be insufficient. Id. at 349.
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.712, .713 (Vernon 1968).
78. 561 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(1) (Vernon 1968).
80. Id. § 1.106. See also id. § 2.715, Comment 4.
81. 564 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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dence of the lost profits of a buyer and held that the trial court had acted
improperly in setting aside a jury award of lost profits. The opinion
stressed that the newly formed buyer firm already had made some profit
and had entered specific contracts with ultimate consumers that could not
be performed due to the seller's breach. The dissenting opinion found the
evidence of lost profits too speculative. Neither opinion cited the relevant
Code provisions or discussed Code policy. Although many of the consid-
erations set out in the decisions cited by the Harper court continue to be
relevant under the Code, Code rules and policies should not be over-
looked.82
F. Miscellaneous Sales Transactions
Entrusting Automobiles. Disputes arising from the sale of an automobile
frequently may be resolved only after analyzing not only the Uniform
Commercial Code but also a certificate of title act. Since the states have
not universally adopted a uniform certificate of title act, court decisions
resolving conflicting claims to motor vehicles are not consonant.83 In Bos-
well v. Connell84 a Texas court had to resolve conflicting claims to a pickup
truck between an unpaid dealer and a purchaser from the dealer's original
customer. The dealer had retained the certificate of title and argued that
the subsequent sale was void under the Texas Certificate of Title Act. 85
The ultimate buyer argued that the dealer had entrusted the truck to the
buyer's seller and that the buyer therefore took full title by virtue of sec-
tion 2.403 of the Code.8 6 The court concluded that the Certificate of Title
Act applied, rendering the subsequent sale void; the dealer, therefore, was
entitled to recover possession of the truck. The court further stated that
there was no conflict between the Code and the Act under the facts before
the court. This conclusion is questionable, and the result is more properly
supported by the maxim that the more specific rule of the Act takes prece-
dence over the general rule in the Code.8 7
II. COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Liability of Parties
Liability of Co-Makers. Unless a note specifies otherwise, co-makers are
82. A Code comment suggests that a seller may recover lost profits even if the seller
cannot show a history of earnings. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708, comment 2 (last
sentence).
83. See generally IB COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 33, §§ 30A.01-.07; I G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 20.1-.8 (1965).
84. 556 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, §§ 51, 53 (Vernon 1977) (violation of Act
to sell motor vehicle without having certificate of title; sales made in violation of Act are
void).
86. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Vernon 1968) (person with voidable title
has power to transfer good title to good faith purchaser for value).
87. But see TEX. KEV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, § 65 (Vernon 1977) (in case of
conflict between the Act and the Code, the Code controls).
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jointly and severally liable on the note.88 A holder therefore may recover
the full amount of a note from any one of the co-makers.89 The co-maker
who pays the holder, however, may recover contribution from each other
co-maker in the amount of his aliquot share, which is presumed to be an
equal share unless the party seeking contribution shows that the co-makers
shared unequally in the consideration received.9" The action for contribu-
tion is based on an implied promise, assumpsit, and the cause of action will
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations for unwritten agree-
ments.9 ' A party who signed a note as an accommodation party, however,
may step into the shoes of the holder by paying the amount of the note,
and he then may sue the accommodated party on the note rather than in
assumpsit. 92 In this case the four-year statute of limitations will apply.93
Negligence Contributing to 4teration. Section 3.406 of the Code provides
that a drawer of a check whose negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration will be estopped from raising that alteration against a
drawee who pays the check in good faith and in accordance with reason-
able commercial standards.94 In Ray v. Farmers State Bank95 a man
gained entry into the home of the plaintiff, an elderly woman, by posing as
an electric utility serviceman. After examining several wall outlets, he
helped the plaintiff to write a check for the $1.50 "service charge." The
man left considerable space between the dollar sign and the numerals, but
the plaintiff nevertheless signed the check. Prior to cashing the check, the
man inserted "185" before the "1.50" and completed the check by writing
"Eighteen Hundred Fifty-One and 50/100." The defendant-bank cashed
the check after asking for identification and before receiving a stop pay-
ment order from the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit to have the bank
recredit her account with the amount of the check. The trial court found
that the bank had acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards but that the plaintiff's acts did not amount to negli-
gence substantially contributing to the loss within the meaning of section
3.406 of the Code. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment for the
plaintiff and held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had "substantially
contributed" to the material alteration by her negligence. She therefore
was precluded by section 3.406 from asserting the alteration against the
88. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(5) (Vernon 1968).
89. Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. See Caldwell v. Stevenson, 567 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
91. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon 1958). See Caidwell v. Stevens,
567 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
92. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.415(e), .603(b) (Vernon 1968). See also id.§ 34.04.
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527(1) (Vernon 1958).
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.406, .407(a) (Vernon 1968). See also id.
§ 4.401(b).
95. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190, 25 UCC Rep. Serv. 779 (Jan. 20, 1979), rev'g 565 S.W.2d
103, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978).
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bank, notwithstanding contrary pre-Code case law.96 The appellate court
buttressed its holding by noting that "the ultimate loss should fall upon the
person who first dealt directly with the wrongdoer and was careless in so
dealing, thereby providing the wrongdoer with the means of carrying out
the offense." 97 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed after con-
cluding that the court of civil appeals erred in finding the plaintiff negli-
gent as a matter of law.98
Extent of Liability-Acceleration. With respect to acceleration clauses in
instruments, the Code merely provides that such clause does not make the
instrument payable at an indefinite time,9 9 which would render it non-
negotiable. The courts, however, have circumscribed the right to acceler-
ate payment.1'° In Purnell v. Follett' 0 the court required evidence that
there was both a formal demand for payment and notice of intent to accel-
erate before the right to accelerate could be exercised. The court held that
the language in the note and deed of trust was not a clear and unambigu-
ous waiver of notice of intent to accelerate.' 0 2 Moreover, the court cited
with apparent approval a court of civil appeals decision requiring the cred-
itor to give the obligor an opportunity to pay the past due portion of the
note before the note could be accelerated. 10
3
The court in Shepler v. Kubena'° also stressed the need for a clear and
unambiguous exercise of the option to accelerate. In that case the court
found that a declaration of intent to accelerate not followed by any affirm-
ative action to enforce the declared intention was ineffective to mature the
note. 105
B. Enforcement of Commercial Paper10 6
As a general matter the Code does not deal in detail with procedural
and evidentiary rules. Section 3.307 of the Code does, however, set out
96. See Lockwood Nat'l Bank v. Jennings, 381 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. 565 S.W.2d at 105.
98. The court held that if conflicting evidence regarding negligence is introduced at
trial, the trial court's finding is binding on the court of civil appeals. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
192. CompareRay with Williams v. Montana Nat'l Bank, 534 P.2d 1247 (Mont. 1975) (hus-
band of drawer found negligent, absolving bank of liability for loss).
99. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.109(a)(3) (Vernon 1968).
100. See Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1975); Sylvester
v. Watkins, 538 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), discussed in
1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 184.
101. 555 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
102. The note provided: "All makers, sureties and indorsers ... waive grace, protest,
notice, demand, diligence, presentation and time of commencement of suit .. " Id. at
765. The deed of trust stated that upon default the holder "shall have the option to declare
all of the indebtedness immediately due and payable and without demand upon, or notice
to, the Grantors, to foreclose the lien." Id.
103. Id. at 764; see Joy Corp. v. Nob Hill Properties, Ltd., 543 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
104. 563 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
105. Id. at 385.
106. See generally 10 DORSANEO, ANDERSON & WINSHIP, supra note 4, §§ 230.01-.203;
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some basic rules governing pleading and burden of persuasion in the en-
forcement of commercial paper. These rules are not fully coordinated with
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and judging from the continuing flow
of reported decisions, both courts and attorneys frequently overlook the
Code's applicability.
Section 3.307 of the Code provides that the "holder" of an instrument
may recover on it by merely producing the instrument unless (1) the effec-
tiveness of the defendant's signature on the instrument is put in issue, or
(2) the defendant establishes a defense.'° 7 A person is a holder if he is "in
possession of. . . an instrument. . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or
to his order or to bearer or in blank."'0 8 The court in Taylor v. Fred Clark
Fell Co. 109 held that a person may satisfy the possession requirement by
the possession of his agent, who may, for example, be an attorney in whose
hands the instrument has been placed for collection.
As to the issue of the defendant's signature, the Code states that no per-
son is liable on an instrument unless his or her signature appears on it."10
The signature may be made by an authorized representative, however, and
even an unauthorized signature may be ratified."' Section 3.307 provides
that the genuineness of a signature is admitted "[u]nless specifically denied
in the pleadings." '" 2 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure add the require-
ment that a plea denying execution of the instrument or the genuineness of
an indorsement must be verified by affidavit.' '3 If the validity of the sig-
nature is put in issue by the pleadings, there is an initial presumption that
Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper. Holder's Procedural Advantages Under Article Three,
65 MICH. L. REV. 1441 (1967).
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307 (Vernon 1968).
108. Id. § 1.201(20).
109. 567 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See also Lazidis v. Goidl, 564 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) (con-
structive possession by owner of note when it was in possession of owner's son, who man-
aged owner's affairs).
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401(a) (Vernon 1968).
I11. Id. §§ 1.201(35), (43), 3.403, .404. See Littlefield, Corporate Signatures on Negotia-
ble Instruments, 55 DENVER L.J. 61 (1978). The Texas Supreme Court cited none of these
provisions in its opinion in Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d 296, 24 UCC Rep. Serv.
194 (Tex. 1978), affg 555 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977). In Reece the
court held the guarantor liable for a corporate debt that the court found enforceable because
the corporation had ratified the forged signature of its vice president by knowingly accepting
the proceeds of the note.
112. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(a) (Vernon 1968).
113. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(h), (i). See Walker v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 559 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ) (affidavit stating no recollection of executing note defective
because it did not recite that it was made on the personal knowledge of the affiant; compare
with rule 93(i) with respect to affidavits denying the genuineness of indorsement); Gonzales
v. American Gen. Leasing & Financing Corp., 555 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977,
no writ) (general denial did not raise issue of genuineness of indorsement; court cited rule
93(i) but not the Code). The language of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is not fully
coordinated with that of the Code. For example, when it refers to "genuineness," rule 93(i)
may refer only to forged indorsements rather than to other forms of unauthorized indorse-
ments, while Code § 1.201(43) applies to both forgeries and indorsements made without
authority. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(43) (Vernon 1968). See also Cowhouse
Dairy, Inc. v. Agristor Credit Corp., 566 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ)
(general denial ineffective to raise issue of prior indorser's authority to indorse note).
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the signature is genuine or authorized. The ultimate burden of establish-
ing the effectiveness of the signature, however, is on the party claiming
under it.' "'
If the authenticity of the signature is admitted or established, the de-
fendant may still set up defenses to the obligation set out in the instrument.
Although the Code distinguishes "real" defenses' "5 from "personal" de-
fenses, ' 6 it does not indicate which defenses must be verified or pled af-
firmatively. As a result, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure control these
further pleading requirements." 7 The Code does, however, provide that
the defendant has the burden of establishing his defenses," 8 and in a sum-
mary judgment proceeding he must show that there are disputed fact is-
sues. !
19
Even if the defendant establishes a personal defense to the obligation in
the instrument, the holder may still recover on the instrument if he carries
the burden of establishing his status as either a holder in due course or a
transferee from a holder in due course. 2' In the original petition the
holder need not plead his status as a holder in due course. If the defendant
raises a defense that a holder in due course can cut off, however, the plain-
tiff should amend his petition to allege holder in due course status.12 ' A
holder who is not a holder in due course may, of course, recover on the
instrument if the defendant does not establish a defense.
The above results follow if the holder of the instrument "produces" the
instrument. 22 Some of the most important decisions in this survey period
concerned the problems of introducing an instrument into evidence, espe-
cially for the purposes of a summary judgment proceeding. In Town North
National Bank v. Broaddus123 and Life Insurance Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc. 124
the Texas Supreme Court held that an unverified copy of an instrument is
a sworn copy within the ambit of rule 166-A(e) 25 if attached to an affida-
114. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(a) (Vernon 1968). See also id § 1.201(8)
(definition of "burden of establishing").
115. Id. § 3.305.
116. Id. § 3.306.
117. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93-95.
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Vernon 1968); see Thigpen v. Thigpen,
563 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (did not cite Code).
119. See Taylor v. Fred Clark Felt Co., 567 S.W.2d 863, 866-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Braselton v. Nicolas & Morris, 557 S.W.2d 187, 188
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
120. TEX. Bus. &COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.302, .307(c) (Vernon 1968).
121. See Hackett v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 570 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
no writ) (plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment with affidavit claiming status as
holder in due course; defendant had answered with general denial, but apparently argued
failure of consideration; court ignored rule 94 which requires defense of failure of considera-
tion to be raised affirmatively; court also bogged down on question of plaintiff-bank's giving
of value, apparently overlooking the possible applicability of Code § 4.208(b)).
122. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Vernon 1968).
123. 569 S.W.2d 489, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 924 (Tex. 1978), rep'g 558 S.W.2d 909, 23 UCC
Rep. Serv. 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977).
124. 570 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1978), rev'g 557 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977).
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
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vit in which the affiant swears the copy is a true and correct copy of the
original instrument. 126 Other cases in this period held that a defendant
may waive his objection to an instrument, 27 that an instrument is properly
before the court if the defendant attaches the instrument to an affidavit in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 28 and that the validity of
an instrument may be admitted by failing to respond to a request for ad-
mission concerning the genuineness of the document. 129
C. Bank Collection
Duties of Collecting Banks. In Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser 130 a
buyer purchased Mr. and Mrs. J.C. Emenhiser's rice crop. To pay for the
rice, the buyer drew drafts on itself payable "through" a Louisiana bank.
One draft was payable to "Gulf Coast State Bank a/c J.C. Emenhiser."' 3 t
Gulf Coast, without the indorsements of the defendant-sellers, issued cash-
ier's checks in the amount of the draft to the manager of the agricultural
cooperative handling the sale for the defendants. Gulf Coast then treated
the draft as a cash item for collection purposes, but the draft was subse-
quently dishonored because of the drawer-buyer's insolvency. Gulf Coast
then sought to recover the amount of the cashier's checks from the
Emenhisers and their landlord. The court of civil appeals affirmed judg-
ment for the defendants on the ground that the bank had not proved that
the cooperative manager was the defendants' agent when he cashed the
sight draft. The Texas Supreme Court, citing section 4.201(a),' 32 ruled
that the manager's agency was not an indispensable element of the bank's
cause of action and held that the trial court had misstated the law in its
jury instructions.' 33 The court of civil appeals was reversed and the case
126. 569 S.W.2d at 490; 570 S.W.2d at 380.
127. Hackett v. Broadway. Nat'l Bank, 570 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
no writ) (plaintiffs affiant failed to allege that copy of checking account attached to affidavit
in support of summary judgment motion was true and correct copy; defect of form waived
by defendant because not brought to attention of trial court prior to rendering of summary
judgment).
128. Barclay v. Waxahachie Bank & Trust Co., 568 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1978, no writ).
129. Packer v. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 567 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
130. 562 S.W.2d 449, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 1259 (Tex. 1978), rev'g 544 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976). The opinion in the court of civil appeals is noted in 1978 Annual
Survey, supra note 2, at 205. Note that the Survey Article stated incorrectly that the draft
was drawn by the defendant-sellers rather than by the buyer.
131. 562 S.W.2d at 450.
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.201(a) (Vernon 1968) provides that the collecting
bank, here Gulf Coast, is the agent of the owner of an item, here J.C. Emenhiser, until the
settlement given by the collecting bank for the item becomes final, and prior to that time any
settlement given for the item is provisional. Id. § 4.212 gives a collecting bank that makes a
provisional settlement a right of refund from its customer if the item subsequently is dishon-
ored. Under id. § 4.211 (c)(3) settlement becomes final if the bank fails to seasonably for-
ward the item for collection before the bank's "midnight deadline," which is defined in id
§ 4.104(a)(8) (see note 134 infra).
133. In addition to the misstatement of the law, there was also some question as to
whether the instruction constituted an illegal comment on the weight of the evidence. Since
the petitioner failed to raise this point in the court of civil appeals, the supreme court held
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was remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
The supreme court found that one special instruction gave the impres-
sion that Gulf Coast was required to present the draft to the Louisiana
bank before midnight on the next banking day, and another implied that
the bank was required to mail the draft directly to the Louisiana bank.
Since neither of these requirements is mandated by the Code, the court
found the instructions to be erroneous. The court concluded that the Code
only requires that the draft be forwarded for collection before the deposi-
tary bank's midnight deadline' 34 and allows the bank to use any "reason-
ably prompt method" of collection under the circumstances. 1
35
Section 4.211 (c) appears to be inapposite when the plaintiff depositary
bank is forwarding an item for collection and has not yet received any
remittance from the drawee. Section 4.202(b) should be the controlling
provision, and it gives the bank the same midnight deadline with the possi-
bility of extension for a "reasonably longer time" if the bank establishes
that this longer time is "seasonable."' 36 Moreover, the measure of dam-
ages if the bank is found not to have exercised care is limited to "the
amount of the item reduced by an amount which could not have been
realized by the use of ordinary care."' 37 Thus, no damages will be
awarded if the collecting bank can show that the drawee would not have
paid the item even if it had been presented promptly.
Collection of Documentary Drafts.'3 8  In New Ulm State Bank v. Brown 139
a seller of livestock entered into a course of dealing with a buyer whereby
the seller would draw a "bill of sale draft" for the agreed sale price, nam-
ing itself as the payee and both the buyer and his bank as drawees. The
seller would place the draft with its bank for collection, and the seller's
bank would then forward the draft with a collection letter to the buyer's
bank.1"° The buyer customarily paid his bank for the draft with a check
drawn against his account at the bank, and the bank would then issue to
the seller's bank a cashier's check for the amount of the draft. The buyer's
bank, however, learned that the buyer was experiencing financial difficul-
ties. After keeping the drafts that were the subject matter of this subse-
quent litigation for from four to ten days after presentment, the buyer's
that the ground of error had been waived. The court cautioned, however, that it did not
approve either the form or the content of the instructions. 562 S.W.2d at 452-53.
134. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §4.211(c)(3) (Vernon 1968). See also id.
§ 4.104(a)(8) (defining "midnight deadline" as midnight on the next banking day following
the banking day on which the bank receives the relevant item).
135. Id. § 4.204(a). See general
, 
id. § 4.202(a)(1) (bank must use ordinary care in send-
ing item for presentment).
136. Id. § 4.202(b).
137. Id. § 4.103(e).
138. "Documentary draft" is defined at id. § 4.104(a)(6) as "any negotiable or non-nego-
tiable draft with accompanying documents, securities or other papers to be delivered against
honor of the draft."
139. 558 S.W.2d 20, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1977,
no writ).
140. Copies of the "bill of sale draft" and collection letter are set out in the court's opin-
ion. 558 S.W.2d at 23-24.
19791
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
bank returned the drafts unpaid. The seller sued the buyer's bank and
recovered both the amount of the unpaid drafts and an additional sum of
$5,000 based on a jury finding that the bank had acted in bad faith in
failing to either pay or return the drafts within the time provided by
law.14
1
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment on two different
theories. First, the court held that the buyer's bank had converted the
drafts within the meaning of section 3.419(a)(2) of the Code.' 42 Since the
collection letter contained the command "[d]o not hold after maturity or
for convenience of payer,"'' 43 the appellate court noted that the trial court
could have concluded that a demand had been made for the return of the
draft at the time of delivery. The intentional failure by the defendant bank
to return the instrument following the demand constituted conversion.
Second, the appellate court concluded that the judgment for the seller
could be sustained on the theory that the buyer's bank was liable as a
"payor bank" for the late return of the draft.'44 Unfortunately, the court's
reasoning on this second theory is not clear. Despite the language of sec-
tion 4.302(b) which sets forth the liability of a payor bank that does not
accept, pay, or return an item within the specified time, and which is
worded broadly enough to encompass documentary drafts, the court ap-
parently relied on the comment to that section, 4 which suggests that the
section is limited to cases covered by section 4.301, a section that does not
apply to documentary drafts. The court then concluded that sections 4.501
and 4.202 establish the bank's midnight deadline as the time within which
the defendant bank had to act, despite the difficulty in fitting a payor bank
within the language of section 4.501.46
D. Bank- Customer Relationship
Bank-Customer Contract. The relationship between a bank and a person
141. The trial court also decreed that the seller's bank was entitled to a preferential lien
on the judgment rendered in favor of the seller and that the buyer's bank was entitled to
judgment against the buyer. Id. at 23. The court granted a lien to the seller's bank because
it had given the seller immediate credit for the draft. Id. at 21; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4.212 (Vernon 1968) (setting forth the conditions under which a collecting bank that
has made a provisional settlement with its customer for an item may revoke its settlement
and charge the customer's account for the amount previously credited on the item).
142. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a)(2) (Vernon 1968). The court did not refer
to any specific subsection of Code § 3.419, but subsection (a)(2) is the only relevant one.
Under that subsection, an instrument is converted when any person to whom it is delivered
for payment refuses on demand either to pay or to return it. The court stressed the language
of the official comment to § 3.419, which states that a demand may be implied under the
circumstances or understood as a matter of custom. Id. § 3.419, comment 2.
143. 558 S.W.2d at 24.
144. Id. at 24-25; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.105(2) (Vernon 1968) (defining
payor bank as a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted).
145. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302 (Vernon 1968).
146. Id. § 4.501 requires a bank that takes a documentary draft for collection to present
the draft, and upon learning that the draft has not been paid or accepted in due course, to
"seasonably" notify its customer of that fact. Id § 4.202(b) states that a collecting bank acts
seasonably if it takes action before its midnight deadline, or within a reasonably longer time
if the bank establishes that its action was seasonable.
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who has established an account with the bank is contractual in nature. 147
The terms of the contract are usually set out in a document prepared by
the bank and signed by the customer when he opens his account 48 al-
though some terms of the contractual relationship may be supplied by im-
plication. 49 The Code also contains some provisions regulating the
relationship. The Code, for example, determines when a bank is author-
ized to charge a customer's account and when it is liable to the customer
for wrongful dishonor. 5 ' The Code's provisions, however, are not com-
prehensive, as illustrated by the recent decision in Groos National Bank v.
Shaw's, Inc. 1' The court upheld the refusal of the bank to accept the
tender by a third party of a deposit to the checking account of one of the
bank's customers 52 The customer had given the third party a check
drawn on insufficient funds, and the third party sought to reduce its loss by
withdrawing the amount in the customer's account. To do this the third
party tendered for deposit the difference between the amount in the ac-
count and the amount of the check. The appellate court held that the bank
was under no duty to accept the tender on the ground that some situations
exist under which the customer might not want to accept a gratuitous de-
posit. 153
Right of Set-Off. Unless there is a special deposit, a bank's relation to its
customer is that of a debtor to a creditor. The bank may set off against its
debt to its customer any indebtedness that the customer owes to it. In
Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.'54 a customer sued the bank to re-
cover the amount that he claimed the bank had wrongfully withdrawn
from his account in order to pay a note. The bank did not offer evidence
in the trial court that the amount withdrawn was owed to the bank by the
customer. The supreme court held that a directed verdict for the bank was
improper because the bank had the burden of pleading and proving the
indebtedness that justified its set-off against the customer's account. The
court rejected, however, the customer's theory that the bank must assert
the customer's indebtedness as a counterclaim.
Wrongful Dishonor. A bank is liable to its customer for damages proxi-
mately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. A customer, however,
147. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas & Barrera, 534 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (Vernon 1968).
149. See id. §§ 4.103(b), (c).
150. Id. §§ 4.401, .402.
151. 555 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
152. The tender was in the form of a check to the customer, and the court noted that the
bank had no authority to indorse the check for her. Id. at 494. Cf. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4.205(a) (Vernon 1968) (depositary bank may supply any indorsement of the cus-
tomer that is necessary to title unless the item specifies otherwise).
153. The court gave as an example the situation where receipt of funds by the customer
would constitute an illegal act. 555 S.W.2d at 494.
154. 562 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1977), rev'g 553 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list
Dist.] 1977).
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may recover only actual damages if the bank dishonored the item by mis-
take.' 55 In First National Bank P. Hubbs156 the defendant bank received a
letter from a third party drawer of checks that alleged that the plaintiff, a
customer of the bank, was indorsing the checks without authority. The
bank subsequently removed over $3,500 from the plaintifis account and
placed it in the form of a cashier's check payable to the plaintiff with the
notation "Funds held pending outcome of dispute."'' 57 Due to this re-
moval a check issued by the plaintiff to the Internal Revenue Service was
dishonored for insufficient funds. Plaintiff brought an action against the
bank on alternate grounds of wrongful dishonor and conversion, although
the case was apparently submitted to the jury only on the theory of conver-
sion. The appellate court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and re-
manded for another trial. Money may be the subject of a conversion
action only if the money can be described as a specific chattel. The court
held that money deposited with a bank ordinarily becomes a general de-
posit, thereby losing its characterization as an identifiable chattel. The
court therefore held that the plaintiff was unable to recover on a conver-
sion theory. The court also held that the plaintiff could not recover for
wrongful dishonor because he had not pled and proved that there was suf-
ficient money in his account to pay the check when it was presented for
payment.
III. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Applicability of the Code
Pre-Code Law-The Concept of "Title. " The concept of "title" played an
important role in pre-Code security law. In the conditional sale transac-
tion, for example, the seller retained title to the goods sold until the buyer
made the final payment, and if the buyer defaulted, the seller could re-
claim "his" goods. Chapter 9 of the Code specifically disclaims reliance on
"title"; each of that chapter's provisions governing rights, obligations, and
remedies apply whether title to the collateral is in the secured party or in
the debtor.'58 Other rules of law, however, may require the courts to de-
termine who has title, and for this purpose pre-Code case law continues to
have some vitality. An example is the recent case of Goetz v. Goetz, 159 in
which the Dallas court of civil appeals looked to pre-Code case law gov-
erning pledges to determine whether the pledgor continued to hold title to
pledged bonds so that the bonds could properly be included in a court-
ordered division of marital property. These pre-Code cases, the court
noted, "remain viable to the extent they are necessary to determine the
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.402 (Vernon 1968). See generalyJ. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 566-74; Holland, An Analysis of the Legal Problems Resultingfrom Wrongful Dishonor, 42 Mo. L. REV. 507 (1977).
156. 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
157. Id. at 377.
158. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.202 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
159. 567 S.W.2d 892, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
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location of title, which is unanswered by the Code."' 6° Given that a
debtor's "rights" in collateral may be involuntarily transferred by judicial
process, 16 1 it is not clear why the court's reference to the transfer of "title"
was necessary.
Unenforceable Security Agreements-Limited Partner. A limited partner
in a limited partnership formed in ajurisdiction that has adopted the Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act may not only make a capital contribution to
the partnership, but may also lend money to the partnership or otherwise
deal with the partnership as if it were an independent third party.' 62 Sec-
tion 13(l)(a) of that Act, however, states that a limited partner may not
"[rieceive or hold as collateral security any partnership property," and sec-
tion 13(2) makes contravention of this limitation a fraud on the creditors
of the partnership. 163 In Kramer v. McDonald's System, Inc.16 4 a general
partner purported to grant to a limited partner a security interest in part-
nership property to secure repayment on a loan made by the limited part-
ner to the partnership. The limited partnership was established in Illinois
to carry on a restaurant business in Texas, where most of the partnership
property was located. A proper financing statement was filed with both the
Texas secretary of state and the county recorder of deeds. The restaurant
lost money and was forced to close, causing the limited partnership to de-
fault on several notes. Another secured party repossessed the collateral
that secured the limited partner's loan, and the limited partner brought a
conversion action against it. The Illinois court held that under section 13
of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act as adopted in Illinois the limited
partner had no security interest in the partnership property. The limited
partner, therefore, had no right to immediate possession of that property, a
requirement that had to be met in order to maintain an action for conver-
sion.
B. Validity of Security Agreement
Security Agreement-Disclosures and Regulation Z. Court opinions con-
struing the disclosure requirements of regulation Z,165 which sets forth the
truth-in-lending rules, continue to proliferate. Two Texas cases decided in
this survey period are of particular importance for the disclosure of a cred-
itor's security interest. 166 Section 226.8(b)(5) requires the creditor to dis-
close "a description or identification of the type of any security interest
held. . . and clear identification of the property to which the security in-
160. 567 S.W.2d at 895 n.2.
161. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.311 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
162. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13.
163. Id. §§ 13(l)(a), (2).
164. 61 111. App. 3d 947, 378 N.E.2d 522 (1978).
165. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1503 & app. (1978). See generally R. CLONTZ, TRUTH-IN-
LENDING MANUAL (4th ed. 1976 & Supp. 1978).
166. See notes 169-72 infra and accompanying text. See also Martinez v. Tropical Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 572 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1978).
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terest relates."' 67 The same provision requires an after-acquired property
clause to be "clearly set forth in conjunction with the description or identifi-
cation of the type of security interest."' 68 In Casillas v. Government Em-
ployees Credit Union69 the disclosure form included the following
statement: "The Security Agreement will secure future or other indebted-
ness and will cover after acquired property." The form did not inform the
debtor of the limitations on after-acquired property rights in consumer
goods set out in section 9.204(b) of the Code' 7 ° and did not inform the
debtor of the type of security interest retained. The court upheld the
debtor's counterclaim based on these violations. In Garza v. Allied Finance
Co. 7 ' the appellate court found that the creditor contravened the same
section of regulation Z for two reasons. First, the reference to after-ac-
quired property did not explain the limitations set forth in section 9.204(b),
and second, the clause was at the bottom of the page rather than "in con-
junction with" the description of the type of security interest retained. 7 2
"Floating Secured Parties." A potential creditor who searches the public
files to discover financing statements filed in the name of the potential
debtor will find the standard financing statement contains only the name
and address of the creditor, who may or may not have entered into a secur-
ity agreement with the debtor, and the types of collateral covered. 
7 3
There is no indication of the amount of indebtedness, and the "types" of
collateral may be very general. 74 If the potential creditor wants addi-
tional information, it will make further inquiries informally or through the
indirect formal procedure set out in section 9.208 of the Code.' 7  Given
the validity of after-acquired property clauses and future advance clauses,
the subsequent creditor with a security interest in the same collateral as
that included within the purview of these clauses takes a calculated risk.
In an opinion that should be read for its outrageous puns if for no other
reason, Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit declared in In re EA. Fretz
Co. ' 76 that a subsequent creditor did not have to take the additional risk
of "floating secured parties." In that case Revlon and Fretz signed a secur-
167. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1978).
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. 570 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
170. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (security interest
does not attach to consumer goods under an after-acquired property clause unless debtor
acquires rights in the goods within ten days after the secured party gives value).
171. 566 S.W.2d 57, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 469 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
172. 566 S.W.2d at 64-65.
173. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
174. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947,
21 UCC Rep. Serv. 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (the words "all inventory"
gives sufficient notice).
175. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.208 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (debtor may send a
statement to secured party listing the aggregate amount of his unpaid indebtedness as of a
specific date and identifying the collateral covered by the security agreement; within two
weeks secured party must send correction or approval).




ity agreement that purported to secure not only Fretz's debts to Revlon but
also Fretz's present and future debts to Revlon's subsidiaries. Revlon
properly filed a financing statement, listing only itself as a secured party.
The subsidiaries entered into separate security agreements, but did not file
financing statements. On Fretz's bankruptcy Revlon applied for payment
of its claim for both Fretz's debt to it and Fretz's debt to its subsidiaries.
The subsidiaries had formally assigned their claims against Fretz to Rev-
lon after the bankruptcy petition had been filed. The court held, however,
that a second creditor would have priority over the claims of the subsidiar-
ies. If Revlon had carried on business with divisions that were not sepa-
rately incorporated, presumably it would have recovered its full claim.
The moral is clear: a separately incorporated subsidiary should enter into
and perfect its own security interests.
C. Attachment and Perfection
Classification of Collateral. A creditor who takes a security interest in a
consumer good has the advantage of automatic perfection without the
need to file a financing statement. 7 If, however, the creditor is worried
that the debtor will sell the good to another consumer, who will take free
of the security interest, the creditor may protect himself by filing a financ-
ing statement in the county clerk's office in the county of the debtor's resi-
dence.' 78 The Code defines "consumer goods" as goods "used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes.' 79 In Mc-
Gehee v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co.'8° the court attempted to clarify this
definition. In that case a secured party filed a financing statement pertain-
ing to a boat in the office of the county clerk. The original debtor sold the
boat to a buyer who had no actual knowledge of the outstanding security
interest. On default by the original debtor, the secured party brought suit
against the buyer of the boat, alleging conversion of his security interest.
The jury found that the boat had been used by the original buyer primarily
for service and not for personal and family use, apparently relying on the
fact that the boat had been registered in the auxiliary coast guard. The
trial court disregarded this finding because it was not supported by the
evidence, and the appellate court affirmed. The court concluded that the
boat was a consumer good within the meaning of the Code and that the
filing with the county clerk perfected the secured party's interest. Under
section 9.307(b) the buyer of the boat took subject to the secured party's
security interest. 1
8
The appellate court ruled that the intent of the debtor at the time the
security interest attaches determines whether the collateral is a consumer
good, and "no creditor is required to monitor the use of collateral in order
177. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
178. Id. §§ 9.307(b), .401(a).
179. Id. § 9.109(a). See also id. § 9.105(a)(8) (definition of "goods").
180. 561 S.W.2d 926, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
181. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.306(b), .307(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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to ascertain its proper classification."' 82 The court referred to the debtor's
intent at the time of "attachment," which under the facts of this case was
the time of the original sale of the boat. The court, however, also spoke of
the actual use of the boat while in the possession of the debtor, which
would seem to be irrelevant. The court might have been referring to the
use of the collateral at the time of perfection, which would be more consis-
tent with the language of section 9.401(c). In most cases, as in McGehee
where only six days separated the time of attachment and the time of
perfection, this distinction will make no difference.
Financing Statement-Description. The Code requires a financing state-
ment to include "a statement indicating the types, or describing the items,
of collateral."'' 83 In McGehee v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. 184 the court
found that factual errors in the financing statement as to the model year
and the engine numbers of the boat, were minor in nature and would not
mislead anyone. Citing section 9.110,'85 the court apparently adopted the
standard that "it is not essential that the description be so specific that the
property may be identified by it alone, if such description suggests inquir-
ies or means of identification, which, if pursued, will disclose the property
covered by the mortgage."'' 86
D. Priorities
Continuation of Security Interest after Sale. Should a debtor sell collat-
eral, section 9.306(b) of the Code 1 87 gives the secured party both a security
interest in the identifiable proceeds and the right to trace the collateral into
the hands of the purchaser unless the secured party has authorized the sale
or the Code provides otherwise. Several cases construing the Texas Code
examined this general rule during the survey period. 188
The most important of these decisions is Weisbart & Co. v. First National
Bank. 9 In that case a secured party repossessed cattle from the debtor
following the debtor's default. A purchaser of the cattle from the debtor,
who had not yet taken delivery because the debtor had agreed to raise the
cattle for him, sued the secured party. The time for the debtor's perform-
ance under the contract of sale had been extended following negotiations
182. 561 S.W.2d at 930. The court also cited TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (filing made in the proper place continues effective for four months
after the location of the collateral or its use is changed).
183. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
184. 561 S.W.2d 926, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd
n.r.e.).
185. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.110 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (description of per-
sonal property or real estate is sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is described).
186. 561 S.W.2d at 932.
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
188. See also McGehee v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 561 S.W.2d 926, 23 UCC Rep.
Serv. 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (security interest continues in con-
sumer goods and is not cut off by § 9.307(b)). The McGehee case is discussed at notes 180-82
supra and accompanying text.
189. 568 F.2d 391, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 797 (5th Cir. 1978).
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in which the secured party had participated, and the buyer claimed that
the secured party had thereby authorized the sale. The jury found that the
secured party had consented and acquiesced in the extension, but that it
did not intend thereby to subordinate its security interest to the buyer's
interest. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the secured party
on the ground that there had been no "sale, exchange or other disposition"
of the collateral so as to trigger the operation of section 9.306(b). The
court then indicated that even though section 9.306(b) did not cover the
situation, the buyer still might succeed under the principles of common
law waiver, which are preserved by section 1.103.90 The court, however,
found that waiver in Texas requires intentional relinquishment of a right.
Under the facts of the case, the jury found that the secured party had not
intended to subordinate its claim, and the buyer therefore was subordinate
to the secured party. 9'
In Montgomery v. Fuquay-Mouser, Inc. 192 the court of civil appeals
found sufficient evidence in the record to affirm the trial court's finding
that the secured party had not waived its security interest in a tractor sold
by the original debtor. The buyer of the tractor from the debtor therefore
held the tractor subject to the original secured party's security interest.
Proceeds-Insurance. Prior to 1972 the Code defined proceeds to include
"whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, col-
lected or otherwise disposed of."' 93 Since no specific reference was made
to insurance payable on destruction of the collateral, courts and commen-
tators were divided on whether insurance payments were proceeds within
the meaning of chapter 9.194 The 1972 amendments to the Code, which
came into effect in Texas on January 1, 1974, resolved this question by
adding the following sentence: "Insurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable
to a person other than a party to the security agreement."' 95 Faced with
an insured loss that occurred in Texas fourteen days before the 1972
amendment went into effect, the federal district court in Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Texas Thermal Industries9 6 concluded that, in the absence of a con-
trary state court decision, the federal court could rely on the draftsmen's
original intention to include insurance payments within the definition of
"proceeds." The court found this original intention manifested in the 1972
amendment itself and in the accompanying comment, which stated that
the new sentence was added to overrule various cases that had held that
insurance payments were not proceeds. The court believed that the
190. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103 (Vernon 1968) (unless displaced by particu-
lar provisions of the UCC, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions).
191. See id. § 1.201(37) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (special property interest of buyer on
identification of goods to contract of sale is not a security interest).
192. 567 S.W.2d 268, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
193. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 785, § 1, at 2343.
194. i COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 33, § 3A.03(c).
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
196. 436 F. Supp. 371, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 1228 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
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amendment was persuasive evidence of the effect which section 9.306 was
originally intended to have. 1
97
Priorities." Secured Party vs. Federal Tax Lien. In Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Texas Thermal Industries98 the court also had to determine whether a
federal tax lien or a state-created security interest had priority to the insur-
ance proceeds upon the destruction of the collateral. Notice of the federal
tax lien against the debtor was filed on December 17, 1973. The secured
party perfected its security interest in the inventory, accounts receivable,
machinery, and equipment of the debtor by filing financing statements
pursuant to state law on January 15, 1973, and June 21, 1973. The inven-
tory was destroyed by fire on December 18, 1973. The court concluded
that when the state security interest has priority over a federal tax lien as to
the original collateral, the priority also applies to the proceeds.' 99 Any
other result, the court noted, would penalize the secured party, who often
is the one responsible for the insurance fund in the first place.
Priorities. Secured Party vs. Unpaid Seller. The unpaid seller who deliv-
ers goods to the buyer is an unsecured creditor and has limited rights to
recover the goods.2°° If the seller purports to retain "title" to the goods
sold, the Code states that the seller retains only a security interest that must
be perfected under chapter 9 of the Code in order to prevail against most
other claimants.20' In spite of these provisions, the unpaid seller in Peer-
less Equipment Co. v. Azle State Bank20 2 claimed that its retention of title
meant that the buyer did not have "rights" in the collateral to which the
secured party's security interest could attach.2 3 The court upheld the se-
cured party's security interest, citing section 2.403(a)(3) to the effect that a
party who has received a good in a "cash sale" may transfer good title to a
good faith purchaser for value, which would include a person who
purchases a security interest. 2°
197. See also TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 11.108 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (unless a
change in law has clearly been made, provisions of new UCC are declaratory of the meaning
of the old UCC).
198. 436 F. Supp. 371, 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 1228 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
199. The court cited PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 91
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(c)-I(d)
(1976).
200. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.702 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (seller may
reclaim goods if buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent). Section 2.702 is now
limited by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(c) (1979).
201. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(37), 2.401(a), 9.113 (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1978-79).
202. 559 S.W.2d 114, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no
writ).
203. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (security
interest not enforceable unless the debtor has rights in the collateral).
204. See also id. § 2.401(b) ("Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the




Judicial Foreclosure. In Garza v. Allied Finance Co.2"5 the secured party
sued to recover the balance due on an installment promissory note follow-
ing the debtors' default. The plaintiffs petition did not specifically plead
or pray for foreclosure of his security interest. Nevertheless, the trial court
ordered foreclosure. The court of civil appeals noted that the creditor
could have proceeded by nonjudicial foreclosure but had the option to en-
force the debt by judicial proceedings. The court held that judicial foreclo-
sure must be specifically requested and that a general prayer does not
fulfill this requirement. 20 6 Presumably, even without a court order, the
secured party could still proceed against the property by self-help.
2°7
Wrongful Repossession. On default by the debtor a secured party has the
right under the Code to take possession of the collateral.20 8 A person who
does not have a security interest in the particular collateral does not have
the right to repossess, and if the person does take possession, he will be
liable as a converter. In Steakley Brothers Chevrolet, Inc. v. Westbrook
219
a dealer that had assigned the security agreement to a bank repossessed the
debtor's motorcycle by picking it up at the debtor's place of employment.
The debtor had taken possession of the motorcycle only thirty-four days
before, had paid a substantial downpayment, and was not delinquent on
any installment. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the debtor,
awarding both actual and exemplary damages for wrongful repossession.
The court affirmed the award of exemplary damages on the theory that "ill
will" may be implied from a knowing conversion of the debtor's property
when the dealer knew or should have known that it did not have a legal
right to repossess. 4
A secured party's right to repossess without judicial process is limited by
the Code's injunction against proceeding by self-help if so proceeding
would necessitate a breach of the peace. In Robertson v. Union Planters
National Bank 21° an agent of the secured party took the debtor's locked
car from her driveway in the middle of the night without her knowledge.
Under the circumstances the court concluded that there was "neither force
nor fraud nor breach of the peace."' 2" The court further indicated that
even if there had been a breach of the peace, the defendant national bank
had not voluntarily and intentionally waived its statutory privilege to be
sued in Tennessee.21 2
205. 566 S.W.2d 57, 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
206.' TEX. R. Civ. P. 301 (judgment of the court must conform to the pleadings).
207. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.50 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) ("The rights
and remedies referred to in this subsection are cumulative.").
208. Id. § 9.503.
209. 558 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. 561 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
211. Id. at 904.
212. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976); see 561 S.W.2d at 903-04.
19791
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Notice of Sale of Repossessed Collateral. After default by the debtor, the
secured party may dispose of the collateral and apply the proceeds to sat-
isfy the indebtedness.21 3 Disposition by the secured party is subject to the
general principle that "every aspect of the disposition including the
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reason-
able.,, 214 The Code also requires the secured party to give the debtor no-
tice of the disposition. 215 Over the years a number of cases have explored
the consequences that follow when the secured party fails to give proper
216notice.
In Bundrick P. First National Bank217 the debtors sought to recover the
penalty provided by section 9.507(a) of the Code. 218 The secured party
failed to give the debtor notice of the sale by auction of the repossessed
car, The secured party sued for the deficiency and produced some evi-
dence that the sale price represented the cash market value of the car and
that the car was sold in the regular course by an established used car auc-
tion dealer. In holding that the debtors' claim under section 9.507(a) was
not well founded, the court stressed that the debtors did not produce evi-
dence that they had sustained any loss and had not shown that the car was
a "consumer good." The court further suggested that even as to consumer
goods the debtor must show some loss or damage before he will be allowed
to recover under section 9.507(a). The court's reading reduces the formula
in that section to one facilitating the establishment of the amount of dam-
age rather than one assessing a statutory penalty for not complyine, with
the Code provisions on default.
In Aetna Finance Co. v. Ables2 19 the secured party sold repossessed col-
lateral without notice to the debtor. The secured party then sued the
debtor for the deficiency, but did not produce evidence showing the mar-
ket value of the collateral at the time of the repossession or sale. Further,
there was no evidence regarding how the sales were conducted. The appel-
late court affirmed a take-nothing judgment on the ground that the trial
court could have found that the original purchase price was the market
price at the time of the sale of the repossessed collateral. The court
reached this conclusion by an ingenious reading of the Code: section
9.504(a) states that a sale of repossessed goods is governed by chapter 2,220
and section 2.723(b) allows the use of a reasonable substitute price when
the market price "at the times or places described in [chapter 2]" is not
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
214. Id. § 9.504(c).
215. Id.
216. See 1977 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 190-92. A leading case examining the
Texas law is United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974).
217. 570 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
218. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (if secured party
violates provisions on disposition of collateral and collateral is consumer goods, debtor is
entitled to recover a penalty).
219. 559 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ). Note that the debtor
appeared pro se.
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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readily available. 221 The court viewed the original purchase price as a po-
tentially reasonable substitute for the market value, in which case there
would be no deficiency on resale. In doing this, the court ignored the pos-
sibility that there were reasonable expenses connected with the reposses-
sion of the collateral. The court also overlooked the statutory penalty that
the debtor can recover when consumer goods are involved and a secured
party fails to follow the Code procedures. A sounder way to reach the
result would be to place the burden on the secured party to show the
amount of the deficiency and, when the Code is not complied with, to
show the deficiency that would exist if the Code had been complied with.
Since this latter figure must be shown by the evidence of the market price
at the time of the sale, the plaintiff secured party in the Aetna case failed to
show the amount of the deficiency, that is, it failed to prove that it was
entitled to recover anything.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS
A. Standby Letters of Credit (Chapter 5)
The letter of credit was created as a payment device to avoid the insecu-
rity involved in the sale of goods across national boundaries. 222 The Code
codified the commercial practices governing the letter of credit, but explic-
itly provided for its continuing evolution.223 Since the drafting of the
Code, use of the standby letter of credit has become much more prevalent.
In the standby letter of credit transaction the issuer of the credit agrees to
pay the beneficiary if the issuer's customer defaults on an obligation run-
ning from the customer to the beneficiary. The federal bank regulatory
authorities recognize the standby letter of credit.224
Under traditional rules governing banking operations a bank did not
have the authority to enter into guaranty agreements because the business
of suretyship was ultra vires. 2 5 While general incorporation statutes have
carefully circumscribed the doctrine of ultra vires, 226 the doctrine contin-
ues to have vitality as to bank activities. In Republic National Bank v.
Northwest National Bank227 the Texas Supreme Court held that a standby
letter of credit was a true letter of credit and therefore it was not ultra vires
for a national banking association to issue such a letter. The court distin-
guished the standby transaction from a guaranty agreement by reasoning
that the issuer of a letter of credit has a primary obligation dependent
221. Id. § 2.723(b) (Vernon 1968).
222. See generally H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES (5th ed. 1974).
223. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.102(c) (Vernon 1968). See also id. § 5.102, com-
ment 2.
224. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1978) (Comptroller of the Currency); id§ 208.8(d) (Federal Re-
serve Board); id. § 337.2 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.).
225. Eg., First State Bank v. Sanford, 255 S.W. 644, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923,
no writ).
226. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04 (Vernon 1956).
227. 578 S.W.2d 109, 25 UCC Rep. Serv. 832 (Tex. 1978), rev'g 566 S.W.2d 358, 24 UCC
Rep. Serv. 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978).
1979]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
solely on presentation of the documents required by the letter, while a
guarantor has a secondary obligation that turns on the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties to the underlying contract.
B. Bulk Transfers (Chapter 6)
Chapter 6 of the Code regulates the transfer in bulk of a major part of
the inventory of any enterprise principally engaged in the sale of merchan-
dise from stock.228 Under section 6.106 of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code a transferee of a bulk transfer must make sure that the
transferor's creditors are paid. 229 In Petereit v. Mid- West Marko, Inc. 230
the court held that a creditor could not recover from the transferee because
it had failed to show either that it was on the list of creditors furnished by
the transferor or that it had filed a written claim within thirty days after
receiving notice of the transfer.2
3 1
C. Documents of Title (Chapter 7)
Chapter 7 of the Code regulates documents of title, including those doc-
uments issued by warehousemen and carriers.232 The chapter assumes
that a document has been issued. Section 7.206(a), for example, sets out
rules governing the termination of storage at the option of the warehouse-
man, and the rules are framed in terms of whether or not the document
fixes the storage period.233 Section 7.206(a), in other words, does not gov-
ern directly when the warehouseman has not issued any document of title.
In American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Reichley 34 the parties orally agreed
on a fixed storage period, but the defendant warehouseman nevertheless
sold the goods before the end of the period. The court held that section
7.206 does not apply to oral agreements and after a cryptic reference to
section 1.102(c),23 5 the court affirmed the lower court's finding for the
plaintiff, holding that the lack of a document does not give the warehouse-
man the option to terminate the storage at will and sell the stored goods.
228. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.102 (Vernon 1968). An American Bar Associa-
tion committee is revising chapter 6. See Hawkland, The Trouble with Article 6 of the UCC"
Some Thoughts About Section 6-103, 82 CoM. L.J. 113, 113 (1977).
229. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.106(1) (Vernon 1968). The official text of the
Code designates this section as "Optional."
230. 564 S.W.2d 442, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978,
no writ).
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.102 (Vernon 1968) requires the transferee of a
bulk transfer to assure that those creditors who fulfill one of these two requirements are
paid.
232. See generally R. RIEGERT & R. BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE (3d ed. 1978).
233. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.206(a) (Vernon 1968).
234. 560 S.W.2d 196, 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.). For an earlier appeal in the same case, see 543 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1976, no writ).
235. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Vernon 1968) (obligations of good faith,





Continuing Guaranty. In Houston Furniture Distributors, Inc. v. Bank of
Woodlake, NA. 236 the defendant guarantor argued that the plaintiff bene-
ficiary of the guaranty agreement had the burden of offering affirmative
proof that the continuing guaranty agreement was in effect on the date on
which the defaulted note was signed. The court stated that a continuing
guaranty agreement remains in effect until revoked and is thus presumed
to be in effect unless the guarantor proves otherwise.
Guarantor's Liability for Attorneys' Fees. A guarantor may expand or re-
strict his liability for the principal's obligation by an express provision in
the guaranty agreement. If the guaranty agreement is silent, the guarantor
ordinarily will be liable in accordance with the terms of the obligation
guaranteed. A guarantor liable for "payment of said note, plus interest,"
for example, must pay attorneys' fees if the note guaranteed provides for
payment of attorneys' fees on default. 37 Where a guarantor guarantees
payment of the costs of collection "including reasonable attorneys' fees,"
the beneficiary must produce evidence of reasonable attorneys' fees, and a
court may not enter judgment against a guarantor for the amount of the
attorneys' fees provided in the note in the absence of evidence that the
amount specified was reasonable.238 If the guarantors sign either the note
guaranteed or a renewal and extension agreement, they will be liable for
the attorneys' fees provided in the note or the extension agreement. If the
guarantors claim that the fees provided in the note are unreasonable, they
must raise the matter as an affirmative defense and obtain an explicit find-
ing on the issue of reasonableness.239
E. Liquidated Damages Versus Penalty
Parties entering into a long-term contract, such as a lease of personal
property, may include in their contract a provision for liquidated damages.
The draftsman of a liquidated damage clause must consider the possibility
that the clause may later be declared unenforceable as a penalty.240 The
difficulties facing the draftsman are illustrated by two cases in this survey
period24' in which the courts held liquidated damage clauses to be unen-
236. 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fst Dist.] 1978, no writ).
237. Barclay v. Waxahachie Bank & Trust Co., 568 S.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
238. Houston Furniture Distributors, Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, N.A., 562 S.W.2d 880,
884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1978, no writ).
239. National Bank of Commerce v. F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co., 564 S.W.2d
499, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ granted).
240. For a discussion of the policies underlying the liquidated damage versus penalty
debate, see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties.- Sense or Nonsense,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 351; Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Un!form
Commercial Code and the Common Law. An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 1055 (1978). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718(a) (Vernon 1968).
241. Servisco v. Tramco, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.); United States Leasing Corp. v. Smith, 555 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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forceable because the clauses could be invoked for very minor breaches of
the contract, resulting in damages that were "unreasonable and a violation
of the principle of just compensation." '242 The plaintiffs in those cases,
however, were permitted to plead and prove actual damages in the alterna-
tive.24 3 The court in one of the cases distinguished earlier opinions enforc-
ing liquidated damage clauses by noting that those cases involved clauses
that could only be invoked for failure to pay rentals, rather than for lesser
breaches.2
F. Sunday Sales
The Texas "Sunday Sale" statute,245 which prohibits the sale of certain
items on specified days, survived yet another attack in this survey period.
In Gibson Distributing Co. v. Downtown Development Association2 46 the
Texas Supreme Court refused to reconsider its earlier decision holding that
the statute was constitutional and did not violate the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 247 The court also consid-
ered and rejected the argument that federal antitrust law pre-empted the
field. The court held that state regulation of commerce in exercise of the
state's police power was exempted from the Sherman Act under the
Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown.24 8
G. Third-Party Creditor Beneficiary
Short-term lenders continue in their struggle to hold long-term lenders
to commitment letters issued to a common borrower. In Texas Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co.249 the short-term lender added a
new twist to previous arguments. Conceding that precedent did not permit
it to enforce the commitment letter as a third-party beneficiary, 250 the
short-term lender argued that since it had been assigned the borrowers'
rights under the commitment letter, it was an "assignee for collateral pur-
242. Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 672, 245 S.W.2d 484, 487 (1952). The courts in both
Smith and Servisco relied heavily on the Stewart case.
243. In the Smith case the plaintiff did not plead either damages for anticipatory repudi-
ation or for past due rentals. 555 S.W.2d at 771. The plaintiff in the Servisco case did plead
actual damages, and the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling that damages for
breach of the requirements contract were too speculative. The appellate court ruled that the
plaintiff did not have to prove a perfect measure of damages, and the plaintiff therefore was
able to base his damages on his past requirements. 568 S.W.2d at 436.
244. United States Leasing Corp. v. Smith, 555 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
245. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
246. 572 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1978).
247. Gibson Prod. Co. v. State, 545 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955
(1977). See also S.S. Kresge Co. v. State, 546 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ
ref d n.r.e.), discussed in 1978 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 219.
248. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
249. 565 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
250. See, e.g., Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 948
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), discussed in 1978 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 220.
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poses" rather than a third-party beneficiary.2 5
The appellate court summarily rejected the argument, holding that the
undisputed facts showed the lender to be a third-party beneficiary. The
court also rejected the short-term lender's argument that the long-term
lender had waived the clause prohibiting assignment of the commitment
letter or was estopped from relying on the clause.
251. 565 S.W.2d at 357. The court did not spell out the appellant's argument that it was
an "assignee for collateral purposes."
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